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Abstract 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) is regarded as one of the most transparent 
central banks in the world. Recent research suggests that one benefit of such transpa-
rency is that financial markets better anticipate a central bank's reaction to incoming 
data and, in relation, do not over-react to macroeconomic data surprises. In this paper, 
we provide institutional details of how the RBNZ communicates its monetary-policy deci-
sions to financial markets and conduct an events analysis to test whether there are any 
transparency benefits in the pricing of New Zealand's yield curve. In line with recent 
empirical literature, our results suggest that short-term interest rates tend to react ap-
propriately to the data flow, while longer-term interest rates are not unduly influenced. 
We also show that market reactions tend to be in line with the RBNZ's inflation-target 
objective.
1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades or so central banks have become considerably more 
transparent about the motivation and thinking behind monetary policy actions. The ge-
nesis of this shift was likely the opening up of capital accounts and associated mo-
vement  away  from  highly  managed  exchange rate  regimes,  wherein  central  bank 
secrecy was the modus operandi,  towards the increasing focus on a price stability 
objective (whether this objective is legislated or not). This shift was re-enforced by 
the fact that some central banks, such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) 
and Bank of England, have had parliamentary Acts passed that require the rationale 
for monetary policy decisions to be publicly disclosed. In general, however, central 
banks with these obligations both provide much more information and communicate 
much more regularly with the public than the statutory obligations. In addition, it  
is notable that central banks without such statutory obligations have also tended to 
increase the transparency surrounding their policy process (e.g. see (Eijffinger, Ge-
raats, 2006)). 
Perhaps the main motivation driving the behavior of central banks themselves 
towards increased transparency is the belief that influencing agents' expectations in 
pursuit of price stability objectives might enhance the efficacy of monetary policy. 
Persuading price and wage setters that the central bank is committed to a “no sur-
* This paper has been prepared for the special issue of the Czech Journal of Economics and Finance on Central 
Bank Communications and Transparency. We would like to thank the seminar participants at the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, two anonymous referees and the editor of this journal for their valuable comments on 
an earlier draft of this paper. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.  522                             Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12
prises” pursuit of its objective might better stabilize inflation expectations and in-
flation itself. In a similar vein, communicating policy decisions to financial market 
participants might better align market pricing of longer-term interest rates (and 
possibly the exchange rate) with the central banks’ policy interests. 
The burgeoning theoretical literature on transparency suggests there may be 
some transparency benefits. In particular, benefits may include a lower output “sacri-
fice” in the transition path from a high to low inflationary environment; the ability to 
conduct policy more flexibly in the Svensson (1997) sense, implying a reduction in 
macroeconomic volatility; a reduction in private sector uncertainty; and closer align-
ment of monetary policy with a socially optimal approach. On the other hand, some 
literature stresses that there may be transparency limits and costs. In particular, given 
that in practice all central banks operate in an environment where there is conside-
rable uncertainty surrounding the way the economy works, the current state and fu-
ture shocks, the formulation of monetary policy is best described as “constrained 
discretion” (Bernanke, 2003). Policy instruments are not set by simple rules or for-
mulas and central banks often revise their outlook for the economy and the monetary 
policy stance along with it. As such, some have argued that providing markets with 
information such as “endogenous” policy interest rate paths may damage the credibi-
lity of the institution should it (inevitably) not follow through with the pre-announced 
path (e.g. (Goodhart, 2001), (Morris, Shin, 2002), (Mishkin, 2004)). In this respect, it 
is notable that the RBNZ, which has published forward interest rate paths since 1997, 
was the only central bank to do so until fairly recently. 
The empirical literature on transparency generally falls into two strands. One 
strand codifies a central banks transparency in some way and investigates whether 
greater transparency is associated with superior macroeconomic outcomes (e.g. see 
(Chortareas, Stasave, Sterne, 2002), (Eijffinger, Geerats, 2006), (Dinçer, Eichen-
green, 2007)). This literature tends to find that countries whose central banks are 
more transparent, such as the RBNZ, tend to have superior inflation outcomes, even 
controlling  for  macroeconomic  and  institutional  characteristics s u c h  as  a central 
bank’s independence. There is also more tentative evidence that central bank trans-
parency reduces output volatility (Dinçer, Eichengreen, 2007). 
Another strand focuses more narrowly on how financial markets respond to 
monetary  policy  and  macroeconomic  data  surprises  (e.g.  see  (Gürkaynak,  Levin, 
Marder, Swanson, 2006) and (Gürkaynak, Levin, Swanson, 2006)). In this literature, 
greater transparency is associated with markets better anticipating central bank ac-
tions and not overreacting to macroeconomic data surprises. A finding of this litera-
ture is that countries with explicit inflation targets – a key measure of transparency – 
tend to have better anchored forward nominal rates and long-run inflation expec-
tations (as measured by inflation indexed bonds). As discussed further below, our 
paper appeals to this strand of the literature in examining the impact of monetary po-
licy transparency in New Zealand. 
The RBNZ is regarded as one of the most open and transparent central banks 
in the world (Eijffinger, Geraats, 2006), (Dinçer, Eichengreen, 2007). This assess-
ment is partly based on the fact that policy decisions accompanied by a Monetary 
Policy Statement (MPS), which are published each quarter, include detailed mac-
roeconomic forecasts upon which the monetary policy decisions are based. Fore-
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dition, the forecasts provide some identification and quantification (in the form of 
alternative scenario analysis) of what the RBNZ sees as the main risks and uncer-
tainties around the central forecast. This provides market participants an idea of how 
the RBNZ is likely to react should these risks unfold. Policy decisions not accom-
panied by a MPS, known as the intra-quarter reviews, are much briefer (typically 
a one- to two-page press release) and do not contain a numerical forecast. Never-
theless, they still outline how the RBNZ views the current state of inflation pressures 
and the broad outlook for the economy. 
Aside from detailed macroeconomic forecasts, several other institutional as-
pects of the RBNZ's communication of monetary policy decisions to financial mar-
kets warrant further elaboration. First, key tools used to prepare the forecasts, includ-
ing the RBNZ's main macroeconomic model, have been published (e.g. see (Black et 
al., 1997), (Conway, Hunt, 1997), (RBNZ, 2004), (Giannone, Matheson, 2006)). In 
the model there is a Taylor-style forward-looking policy rule. Although the rule is by 
no means a literal interpretation of how the RBNZ will react to data, and the pub-
lished model-based forecasts are always subject to considerable judgments, in prin-
ciple this information still gives market participants an idea of how the RBNZ will 
react to “surprises” in the data flow and how it views the policy transmission mecha-
nism. 
Second, before publication of the decision (whether it is a MPS or intra-quar-
ter review) there is a running dialogue between the RBNZ and market economists 
regarding how markets might interpret alternative phrasings of the upcoming policy 
announcement. These feed into the drafting of the releases in a conscious effort to 
align markets with the RBNZ's point of view. Third, before the general release of 
a MPS, a lock-up is held at the RBNZ for financial market analysts. Attending this 
lock-up are senior RBNZ economists who are available for questioning from the fi-
nancial analysts. This gives the analysts time to digest the nuances of the MPS and 
the opportunity to check their understanding against RBNZ economists. Fourth, outside 
of these times, the RBNZ periodically holds sessions with financial market analysts to 
discuss in more detail technical aspects of the forecast. Finally, many financial market 
economists and analysts in New Zealand have worked at the RBNZ and thus have had 
a first-hand account of the tools used at the RBNZ and the policy-making process. 
Given the empirical literature and the institutional aspects of New Zealand's 
policy transparency discussed above, it might be thought that New Zealand would 
experience monetary policy transparency benefits. Broad cross-country support of 
this is seen in (Dinçer, Eichengreen, 2007), whose results suggest that transparency 
has reduced output and inflation variability in New Zealand. More indirect evidence 
is seen in (Schmidt-Hebbel, 2006), who finds that New Zealand's historical monetary 
policy has operated closer to the so-called efficient policy frontier than a comparable 
group of small open-economy inflation-targeters. In addition, as discussed further 
below, a recent study by Karagedikli and Siklos (forthcoming) suggests that the New 
Zealand dollar reacts to data surprises and monetary policy in a way consistent with 
a credible and transparent central bank. However, to date, there has been no analysis 
of the possible transparency benefits on New Zealand's yield curve. Partly, this re-
flects that until March 1999 New Zealand's  monetary policy implementation was 
fairly unconventional and relied upon so called “open-mouth operations” to influence 
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(see (Guthrie, Wright, 2000). As such, it is only recently that there has been suf-
ficient data to examine the impact of policy and data surprises on New Zealand's 
yield curve at frequencies that enable a robust interpretation of the results. 
We construct a data set that includes intra-daily interest rates over the yield 
curve, data surprises for variables such as unemployment and inflation, and several 
measures of monetary policy surprises. We then conduct an “events analysis” similar 
to Kuttner (2001), Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2006) and Gürkaynak, Levin 
Marder and Swanson (2006) to estimate the impact of data and monetary policy sur-
prises on New Zealand's yield curve. Our results suggest that in response to data 
surprises, short-term interest rates react in a direction that is helpful for monetary 
policy purposes, while long-term forward rates remain relatively well anchored. This 
result is firmly in line with the recent literature and can be interpreted as a transpa-
rency benefit. 
In response to positive monetary policy surprises, both short- and longer-term 
forward rates tend to rise, although the impact at very long horizons is not robustly 
significant. Our interpretation of this result is that markets view the central bank’s 
monetary policy stance as credible and lift rates over the curve accordingly. Rates are 
increased over the short to medium run as markets come into line with the RBNZ's 
view of inflationary pressure, but do not increase over the medium to longer run (i.e. 
from around seven years forward) on the expectation that the central bank will get on 
top of inflationary pressures. We also find that market reactions tend to be marginally 
larger at times when a decision is accompanied by the release of a full Monetary Po-
licy  Statement,  indicating  that  the information  provided  in  the statement  influen- 
ces the market over and above the much more limited information set provided in 
the intra-quarter reviews. 
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 reviews the literature on monetary po-
licy and data surprises and motivates the empirical specifications used in this paper. 
Section 3 briefly describes the data used in this paper and how we construct sur-
prises. In Section 4 the empirical results are presented, while Section 5 concludes this 
paper. An appendix provides some robustness testing of the empirical analysis. 
2. Literature Review 
The early empirical literature on the effects of monetary policy on asset prices 
(and the economy more broadly) typically estimated the impact of changes in ob-
served policy rates on variables of interest directly (Cook, Hahn, 1989). However, to 
the extent  that  policy  moves  are  anticipated  by  market  participants,  the estimated 
impacts will be biased downwards and monetary policy will look less effective than 
its true impact. In principle then, one needs to differentiate the anticipated and unan-
ticipated components of any monetary policy actions. 
Several approaches have been applied in the literature to better identify the im-
pact of monetary policy on the economy. Perhaps the most popular is the vast vector 
autoregressions (VAR) literature (e.g., see (Buckle et al., 2002) and (Smith, Haug, 
2007) for applications on New Zealand data). However, there is considerable debate 
over the robustness of VAR estimates of policy shocks (Rudebusch, 1998), (Brunner, 
2000). In addition, as Kuttner (2001) notes, there is also the issue of whether estimates 
of monetary policy shocks derived from current data are robust to the real-time data 
measures policymakers and market participants had at the time of actual policy im-Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                    525 
plementation. A growing literature suggests that data revisions have a significant im-
pact on the econometric estimates (e.g. see (Koenig, Kishor, 2005)) and it is reco-
gnized that revisions are substantive in the New Zealand data (see (Sleeman, 2005)). 
A more recent strand of literature, which we follow in this paper, uses high 
frequency data to estimate the impact of monetary policy shocks on asset prices. In 
a seminal paper, Kuttner (2001) uses Federal Reserve fund futures to calculate the un-
anticipated component of monetary policy and estimates its impacts on a range of 
asset prices at daily frequencies. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Gürkaynak (2005), 
Gürkaynak et al. (2005a,b) and others use the same or similar measures of surprises. 
The regression used in this literature takes the following form: 
        01 ǻǻ DD H    tt t AS
where  ǻ t A  is the change in an asset price, while  ǻS  represents the surprise element 
from monetary policy.
1
A motivation for this literature is that the endogeneity between policy and 
changes in asset prices are likely to be small using high frequency (daily or intra-
daily) data. At these frequencies, it is possible to zero in on the minutes around an event 
that occurs exclusively due to a monetary policy action. In addition, the real-time data 
issues are immaterial as financial market prices are not subject to revision. However, 
the approach is not without its pitfalls and limitations. First, it is not always easy to 
isolate particular events. For example, as discussed in greater detail below, there can be 
several announcements that arrive within a very short time before and after the release 
of, say, a monetary policy report or the setting of the overnight cash rate. 
Many researchers have found that news events dissipate within a matter of 
hours (Goodhart et al., 1993), (Andersen et al., 2005). Therefore, using daily data may 
underestimate the short-run effects of unexpected events on asset prices whose im-
pact may peak within minutes of the arrival of new information only to be reversed 
later the same day. On the other hand, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004a, 2004b) argue 
that intra-daily data contain overreactions of the markets, and they defend the use  
of daily data. Not all market participants necessarily react within a few hours. For 
example, they may wait for a day or so to determine whether the surprise reflects a per-
manent or a transitory change in policies. There is also a presumption that markets 
react to the same news at the same time.
2 In this paper we focus on intra-daily effects 
on the basis that estimates tend to be more significant at this horizon, but as shown in 
Section 4, our results are similar at daily frequencies. 
Perhaps the most substantive limitation of the event study approach applied in 
this paper is that it is not possible to use it to directly examine the impact of monetary 
policy on the economy beyond asset prices as variables such as GDP, inflation and 
employment are not, of course, compiled by statistical agencies at frequencies shorter 
than a quarter or perhaps a month.
3 That said, in isolating the impact of policy shocks 
1 More recently, the focus has shifted to asking how surprises generated by the central bank via the com-
munications channel can influence asset prices. 
2 Additionally, there is the problem that intra-daily data appear not to be a martingale while difference 
stationarity characterizes data sampled at the daily frequency.  
3 It is possible, however, to indirectly study the broader impacts by treating the expected future path of interest
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on the yield curve it is still possible to directly examine the impact of monetary po-
licy on a crucial part of the transmission mechanism – the impact of policy rates on 
longer-term rates. If an inflation-indexed bond market exists, the approach may also 
be used to examine how inflation expectations adjust in response to monetary policy 
shocks, from which direct inferences on the central bank’s credibility and transpa-
rency may be made. 
In addition, the approach enables us to consider the impact of data surprises 
on asset prices by including in the regressions a measure of news, or data surprises. 
These are commonly measured as follows: 













where  , it s  is the surprise component of a type i announcement at time t. This is de-
fined by the difference between the announced value of the economic indicator in 
the question,  D,  and  its  median  expected  value  based  on  forecast  or  survey  data 
( [] EA) divided by the sample standard deviation, V , which standardizes the surprise, 
thereby permitting a comparison of regression coefficients across different kinds of an-
nouncements. 
How the markets react to the data surprise may also contain information about 
the central bank’s transparency and credibility. Gürkaynak, Levin, Marden and Swan-
son (2006), for example, argue that if a central bank's inflation target is credible, a sur-
prise related to inflation should not have any effect on interest rates at very long 
horizons, as predicted by almost all macro models (including the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand's main macroeconomic model, see (Black et al., 1997). We examine 
whether this holds in the New Zealand data in Section 4. 
How the exchange rate adjusts to data surprises may also have some bearing 
on the central bank’s credibility and transparency. In particular, Clarida and Wald-
man (2006) find in an events study that a positive inflation data surprise only con-
sistently appreciates nominal exchange rates in their sample of inflation-targeting 
countries (including New Zealand), as markets presume the central bank will react to 
the news by increasing real interest rates. In contrast, the price-level effect (i.e. de-
preciation) sometimes dominates in periods before the adoption of inflation-targeting 
frameworks, and in non-inflation targeting countries more broadly. These results sug-
gests that in inflation-targeting countries a transparency and credibility benefit is that 
markets generally adjust exchange rates in a direction that is helpful for policy ob-
jectives.
4
The exchange rate is of course a key part of the transmission mechanism in 
small open economies such as New Zealand. Although examining how the New Zea-
land dollar adjusts is outside the scope of this paper, a study by Karagedikli and 
Siklos (forthcoming) finds that the New Zealand-US dollar and the New Zealand- 
4 Note that the exchange rate adjustment likely reflects both transparency and credibility. A central bank
with a transparent price stability framework that, nevertheless, did not adjust policy rates in response to
persistent inflation surprises would likely soon lose credibility and hence the exchange rate might fall in 
response to further inflationary surprises. In a credible central bank without transparent objectives, markets 
might not always increase the exchange rate in response to inflationary surprises as it is not as obvious
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-Australian dollar cross rates tend to appreciate in response to inflation data surprises 
in line with the Clarida and Waldman estimates. Moreover, Karagedikli and Siklos 
examine  the impact  of  a broader  range  of  data  and  monetary  policy  surprises  on 
the New Zealand dollar. Stronger-than-expected activity measures tend to appreciate 
the exchange rate, and similarly, positive monetary policy shocks also cause the cur-
rency to appreciate. Overall, these results likely indicate a transparency and credibi-
lity benefit of New Zealand's inflation targeting regime. 
3. Data 
In this section, we briefly describe the monetary policy and data surprise 
measures. 
3.1 Monetary Policy Surprises 
In the United States, a Federal Reserve fund-futures market exists from which 
a natural measure of monetary policy surprises may be constructed. In New Zealand, 
there is no direct futures market for the Bank's policy instrument, the Official Cash 
Rate (OCR); however, there are three reasonable proxy measures of monetary policy 
surprises one can construct from the available data: 90-day bank bill futures, Over-
night Indexed Swaps (OIS) and a Reuters survey of market participants. We discuss 
these measures in turn. 
The 90-day bank bill rate is determined in wholesale commercial bank mar-
kets and in practice is very highly correlated with the OCR, although term premia  
can weaken the relationship at times. The first, second, third and fourth contracts of 
the 90-day bank bill futures are quite liquid and can be used to calculate different 
components of the surprise in a similar fashion to Gürkaynak (2005). The available 
intra-daily data required to construct this measure of monetary policy surprises be-
gins in August 2000.
5
An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange, or 
‘swap’, for an agreed time period, a series of fixed interest rate payments for a series 
of variable interest rate payments (or vice versa). An Overnight Indexed Swap is a spe-
cial type of interest rate swap in two respects. First, OIS contracts involve the ex-
change of obligations for relatively short periods. Second, the floating reference rate 
in the OIS is the overnight rate, whereas the floating rate for most interest rate swaps 
is generally set less frequently, with reference to a quarterly or semi-annual interest 
rate. OIS rates can then be regarded as providing the ‘cleanest’ market-based mea-
sure of OCR expectations because of the smaller term premium embedded in OIS 
yield (see (Choy, 2003) for details). Although this market is now very liquid in New 
Zealand (and in many other countries) the available data span is quite short as OIS 
contracts only began trading in New Zealand in February 2002. 
Finally,  the Reuters  survey  of  market  participants  in  New  Zealand  about 
the probability they attach to an upcoming policy shift is taken into account. From 
this, a median market expectation of the future OCR setting, and thus a monetary po-
licy surprise, can be constructed. However, a limitation of this measure is that the gap 
between when market participants are surveyed and when the policy announcement 
5One can also use the change in the 90-day bill rate that the RBNZ tries to influence at the time of the po-
licy announcements. Surprises measured from the 90-day bank bill rates are almost identical to the bank
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is made can be as large as 25 days. As such, at times key pieces of data may arrive in 
the interim and change market participants’ expectations of the upcoming policy an-
nouncement.
6 Table 1 summarizes the measures of the surprises we use. 
Table 2a reports the descriptive statistics for the three different measures of 
monetary policy surprises. Their means are not statistically different than zero, while 
the minimum  and  maximum  variables  match  each  other  fairly  closely.  However, 
the standard deviations of the measures do differ and correlation coefficients vary be-
tween 0.70 and 0.83, indicating that they are close but not perfect substitutes.  
In Table 2b we divide our sample into decisions coinciding with the release of 
a full MPS, and the intra-quarter review decisions. Surprises are not significantly dif-
ferent between the two sub-samples, suggesting that the RBNZ does not use the op-
portunity of a full MPS to “suprise” the markets to a greater extent than what occurs 
in the intra-quarter reviews.  
TABLE 1  Surprise Measures 
Measure  First 
observation 
No
of observations  Shorthand 
Change in 1st contract 
of the Bank Bill Futures 16 Aug 2000  55 s1
Weighted Market Ex-
pectations by Reuters  14 November 2001 48 s2
Change in Overnight 
Indexed Swaps  20 March 2002  43 s3
TABLE 2a Descriptives of Surprises 
Surprise 1  Surprise 2  Surprise 3 
Mean    -0.005  0.003  -0.001 
Absolute Mean      0.073  0.83  0.072 
Maximum  0.23  0.20  0.19 
Minimum  -0.21  -0.17  -0.19 
Std Dev    0.073  0.83  0.072 
Obs  55  48  43 
Pairwise Correlation 
Surprise 1  Surprise 2  Surprise 3 
Surprise 1  1     
Surprise 2  0.70  1   
Surprise 3  0.83  0.72  1 
TABLE 2b  Descriptives of for MPS and OCR Reviews 
Surprise 1  Surprise 2  Surprise 3 
   MPS   
Mean  -0.001  0.001  0.004 
Absolute Mean  0.054  0.053  0.032 
St Dev  0.073  0.086  0.069 
Inter-quarter review 
Mean  -0.009  0.005  -0.008 
Absolute Mean  0.044  0.047  0.032 
St Dev  0.075  0.082  0.073 
6 See (Gordon , Krippner, 2001) for a discussion of different measures of OCR expectations. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                    529 
3.2 Data Surprises 
To examine the impact of data surprises on New Zealand's yield curve, sur-
prise measures for six major data announcements are constructed: Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), Current Account (CA), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Retail Sales (RS), 
Trade Balance (TB) and the Unemployment Rate (U). This gives us a set of data 
surprises comparable to that seen in (Gürkaynak, Levin, Marder, Swanson, 2006) and 
others. Of course the data the markets react to is not only limited to these variables. 
However, these are the main variables for which Reuters or Bloomberg have sur-
veyed market participants for their expectations and thus does represent our feasible 
choice set.  
In constructing data surprise measures we use the median market expectation 
for every variable concerned. It should be noted, however, that the number of parti-
cipants surveyed varies between 9 and 15, with a mean of around 13. The survey na-
ture of these variables and the small number of market participants actually surveyed 
implies that there is likely to be a measurement error in the data surprises. However, 
it is assumed that the variance in the measurement error is much smaller than the va-
riance of the variable concerned and therefore the bias this poses is likely to be small.  
Table 3 gives more information about the release time of the data, their fre-
quency and date of the first observation for these variables in our data set. The num-
ber of observations we have for the quarterly data is very small, at only 22 for CA
and 23 for GDP and CPI. However, the sample size is larger for the RS and TB series 
which is available monthly.  
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1 Methodology 
We follow the event analysis literature and estimate OLS regressions of the fol-
lowing form:  
      01 ǻǻ DD H    tt t AS
where ǻ t A  is the change in the interest rate concerned, while  ǻ t S  represents the sur-
prise element, which may be a monetary policy or data surprise. Standard errors for 
the coefficients are constructed using the Huber-White statistic.  
Perhaps  the main  critique  of  this  approach  is  that,  when  considering  data 
surprises, the estimated slope coefficients may contain information about more than 
one state variable in the economy (Faust et al., 2007). For example, consider a positi-
ve GDP surprise. The surprise may mainly reflect stronger-than-expected demand, 
perhaps  implying  the need  for  tighter  monetary  policy;  it  could b e  t h e result  of 
TABLE 3  Data Announcements 
Variable  Frequency  Time  





CPI Quarterly  10.45 am  18 April 2001  23
GDP Quarterly  10.45 am  29 June 2001  23
CA Quarterly  10.45 am  26 June 2001  22
U Quarterly  10.45 am  10 May 2001  23
RS Monthly  10.45 am  6 April 2001  68
TB Monthly  10.45 am  10 April 2001  65530                             Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12
stronger-than-expected productivity growth, which may imply a looser policy stance 
going forward; or, as is often the case in a fairly small economy like New Zealand, 
the surprise  may  be  narrowly  concentrated  in  one  sector  of  the economy,  with  few 
policy implications. The estimated coefficient will then likely represent the “net” effect 
of the underlying reasons for the data surprises. If the underlying reasons balance out 
over the estimation sample, it is possible that the estimated coefficient will be insignifi-
cant even if markets react strongly to the data surprises. As such, ideally one would like 
to distinguish between the causes of the data surprises in order to cleanly identify 
the estimated coefficients. However, as our sample mainly covers a period of very ro-
bust growth and strong inflation pressure in New Zealand, it is plausible that surprises 
to activity and inflation measures mainly reflect a “demand side” interpretation.
7
4.2 Responses of Implied One- and Two-Year Swap Rates 
Does the yield curve respond to data surprises in a way that is consistent with 
a transparent and credible inflation-targeting central bank? In this section we investiga-
te this by means of simple regressions of the standardized data surprise on the changes 
in implied one-year and two-year forward swap rates up to seven years ahead.
8
The lack of depth in instruments at all horizons makes it difficult to calculate the im-
plied one- and two-year rates beyond the five- and seven-year horizons. Table 4 shows 
the responses of the one-year nominal swap rates ending in one, two, three and five 
years within windows of 30 minutes and 60 minutes after the surprise. Table 5 shows 
responses of the two-year nominal yields ending in two, three, five and seven years.  
The monetary policy surprises ( 1 s  to  3 s ) are in basis points. This implies that 
we can multiply the size of any monetary policy surprise by the estimated coefficients 
to infer the impact on forward rates. For example, in the top-left cell of Table 4 a sur-
prise of 100 basis points suggests one year nominal rates increase by 92 basis points. 
Moving further along the yield curve, the impact of monetary policy shocks diminish 
but still remain significant on the s1 surprise measure. For example, the response of 
implied one-year rates ending in five years is still around 25 basis points for our hy-
pothetical surprise of 100 basis points and two-year rates ending in seven years is 
around 11 basis points. Responses to monetary policy surprises are very similar for 
the surprise measures of  1 s  and  3 s , although at the longest horizon we can construct 
data, monetary policy shocks are not significant from the  3 s  measure. The responses 
are significantly lower, however, for the  2 s  measure. This is likely due to a very large 
“measurement error” in the Reuters surveys arising from the small sample and sig-
nificant time delays in survey collections, as discussed above. Hence one would ex-
pect a downward bias on the estimated coefficients.
9
7 Over the sample, growth in New Zealand was the strongest it has been in the post-war period and the un-
employment rate fell to multi-decade lows. The RBNZ estimates that the output gap was positive through-
out this period. See (RBNZ, 2007) for an in-depth discussion of the New Zealand economy since around 
the start of this decade. 
8 We use the pure expectations model of the term structure of interest rates to calculate the implied forward 
interest rates. For example, the two-year interest rate beginning in five years and ending in seven years
could be calculated as the solution to 
75 2 [1 (0, 7)] [1 (0, 5)] [1 (5, 7)]     ii i , where  (,) ijt is the interest 
rate starting at period j and ending in period t. Also note that there are severe liquidity issues in the go-
vernment  bond  and  bank  bill  markets  in  New  Zealand,  hence  the use  of  the swap  yields  to  measure 
the yield curve. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                    531 
Overall, monetary policy shocks have a large and significant impact on im-
plied forward rates at short horizons and a diminishing impact on forward rates at 
longer horizons. These results can be interpreted as a transparency and credibility be-
nefit of the operation of monetary policy in New Zealand. The result that shocks to 
monetary policy have a large impact on forward short-term interest rates suggests 
that  markets  believe,  in  general, t hat  the RBNZ  will  indeed  follow  through  with 
a tighter (looser) policy stance for some time. But the fact that the estimated impact 
diminishes at longer horizons suggests that market participants also expect that 
the RBNZ will get on top of inflationary pressure over the longer run.  
Data surprises are standardized by the standard deviations of the actual data. 
Therefore the coefficients reported in Tables 4 and 5 imply the responses of a one- 
-standard deviation surprise in basis points (multiplied by 100). For example, it is esti- 
TABLE 4  Responses of One-Year Rates 
1y1  1y2  1y3  1y5 
30 Min  60 Min  30 Min  60 Min  30 Min  60 Min  30 Min  60 Min 
s1 0.927***  1.017***  0.434***  0.498***  0.362***  0.334***  0.289***  0.255*** 
se (0.060)  (0.076)  (0.095)  (0.083)  (0.057)  (0.068)  (0.055)  (0.053) 
R sq 0.87  0.82  0.34  0.30  0.46  0.33  0.21  0.19 
Obs  55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
s2 0.598***  0.638***  0.224**  0.248**  0.221***  0.170**  0.190**  0.135** 
se (0.109)  (0.125)  (0.100)  (0.097)  (0.069)  (0.065)  (0.071)  (0.065) 
R sq  0.42  0.39  0.11  0.09  0.20  0.10  0.22  0.10 
Obs  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
s3 0.881***  0.964***  0.396***  0.475***  0.300***  0.309***  0.251***  0.231*** 
se (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.109)  (0.090)  (0.076)  (0.069)  (0.084)  (0.076) 
R sq  0.64  0.62  0.27  0.28  0.28  0.22  0.28  0.20 
Obs  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
CPI 0.040***  0.039***  0.028**  0.038***  0.020***  0.020***  0.014**  0.006 
se (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.008) 
R sq 0.67  0.59  0.31  0.43  0.37  0.19  0.27  0.05 
Obs  23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
GDP 0.038***  0.038***  0.054***  0.067***  0.017***  0.025***  0.010  0.020 
se (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
R sq  0.56  0.55  0.41  0.44  0.17  0.28  0.06  0.15 
Obs  23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
CA -0.001  -0.006  -0.016  0.002  -0.006  -0.016**  0.009  -0.002 
se (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
R sq  0.00  0.03  0.09  0.00  0.10  0.11  0.02  0.00 
Obs  22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
RS 0.013***  0.012***  0.009**  0.011**  0.006***  0.007**  0.004*  0.007** 
se (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
R sq 0.41  0.34  0.10  0.12  0.10  0.09  0.04  0.07 
Obs  68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68
TB -0.002  -0.002  0.002  -0.239  -0.001  -0.255  -0.003  -0.265 
se (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.239)  (0.002)  (0.249)  (0.002)  (0.261) 
R sq  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.00  0.04  0.02  0.04 
Obs  65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
U -0.066***  -0.076***  -0.029  -0.057***  -0.033***  -0.049***  -0.045***  -0.044** 
se (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.016) 
R sq 0.64  0.60  0.13  0.38  0.29  0.42  0.43  0.34 
Obs  23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
9 Karagedikli and Siklos (forthcoming) analytically show the effects of this measurement error, which 
is slightly more complicated than the classical measurement error. This introduces even a larger bias in 
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mated that a one-standard deviation CPI surprise increases the one-year swap rate by 
four basis points. This effect diminishes as we go further out on the yield curve. This 
effect goes down to one basis point in the one-year swap rate ending in five years. 
Statistical significance disappears in the 60 minute window for the response of the one- 
year rate ending in five years.  
In general, the impact of data surprises on forward rates is in line with our ex-
pectations. In response to positive shocks to GDP, inflation and retail sales interest 
rates initially increase. In response to a positive shock to the unemployment rate, for-
ward rates fall. In theory, how monetary policy should respond to shocks to the cur-
rent account and trade balance is ambiguous (e.g. a positive shock to the trade ba-
lance might imply stronger-than-expected commodity prices and export volumes; alter- 
TABLE 5  Responses of Two-Year Rates 
2y2  2y3  2y5  2y7 
30 Min  60 Min  30 Min  60 Min  30 Min  60 Min  30 Min  60 Min 
s1  0.693***   0.780***   0.399***   0.417***   0.323***   0.295***   0.171**   0.118** 
 se   (0.071)   (0.078)   (0.071)   (0.072)   (0.048)   (0.049)   (0.070)   (0.051) 
 R sq   0.73   0.69   0.43   0.34   0.32   0.29   0.040   0.022 
 Obs   55   55   55   55   55   55   55   55 
s2  0.415***   0.447***   0.223***   0.210**   0.197***   0.156**   0.094   0.049 
se  (0.097)   (0.109)   (0.081)   (0.079)   (0.066)   (0.062)   (0.081)   (0.051) 
R sq   0.31   0.28   0.16   0.10   0.22   0.12   0.057   0.019 
 Obs   45   45   45   45   45   45   45   45 
s3  0.645***   0.728***   0.349***   0.393***   0.278***   0.280***   0.118   0.063 
se  (0.076)   (0.069)   (0.085)   (0.075)   (0.073)   (0.067)   (0.091)   (0.057) 
R sq   0.54   0.51   0.30   0.27   0.32   0.28   0.062   0.022 
 Obs   43   43   43   43   43   43   43   43 
 CPI   0.035***   0.038***   0.024***   0.029***   0.015***   0.012*   0.005   0.001 
se  (0.004)   (0.005)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.004)   (0.007) 
R sq   0.80   0.73   0.41   0.41   0.34   0.18   0.051   0.000 
 Obs   23   23   23   23   23   23   23   23 
GDP  0.046***   0.052***   0.035***   0.046***   0.014   0.021**   0.008   0.028* 
 se   (0.012)   (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.008)   (0.010) 
R sq  0.49   0.50   0.38   0.42   0.16   0.23   0.039   0.306 
 Obs   23   23   23   23   23   23   23   23 
CA  -0.008*   -0.001   -0.011   -0.007   0.008   0.001   -0.001   0.001 
se  (0.004)   (0.009)   (0.007)   (0.009)   (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.009) 
R sq  0.14   0.00   0.11   0.03   0.08   0.00   0.001   0.000 
 Obs   22   22   22   22   22   22   22   22 
RS  0.011***   0.012***   0.007***   0.009**   0.006***   0.006**   0.004**   0.008* 
se  (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002)   (0.003) 
R sq  0.33   0.25   0.13   0.13   0.14   0.08   0.080   0.146 
 Obs   68   68   68   68   68   68   68   68 
TB  0.000   0.000   0.001   -0.247   -0.001   -0.259   -0.001   -0.268 
 se   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.244)   (0.002)   (0.257)   (0.002)   (0.262) 
R sq   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.04   0.00   0.04   0.004   0.040 
 Obs   65   65   65   65   65   65   65   65 
 U   -0.048***   -0.066***   -0.031**   -0.053***   -0.037***   -0.038***   -0.020**   -0.018* 
 se   (0.012)   (0.014)   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.011)   (0.013)   (0.009)   (0.010) 
R sq  0.52   0.59   0.30   0.47   0.41   0.32   0.117   0.114 
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natively it could result from weaker-than-expected domestic demand). In line with 
this  ambiguity,  the effects  of  trade  balance  and  current  account  shocks  are  in-
significant.
10
In general, the impact of data surprises dies out at long horizons. The excep-
tion to this finding is surprises related to the unemployment rate, which still show 
significant effects on the two-year forward rate at seven years, the maximum horizon 
permitted in our regressions. That said, the decay rate on the unemployment impact 
moving along the yield curve is large, and as such it is plausible that at the ten-year 
horizon, the “benchmark” in the literature, its impact would not be significant.  
To see these results in a broader context, Table 6 reports some of the previous 
results along with the relevant international findings, whose sample includes a selec-
tion of inflation-targeting countries and the United States. Initial responses to data 
and monetary surprises tend to be significant across all countries, while long-term 
rates tend not to be affected across any countries except the United States. Again, this 
result can be interpreted as a transparency benefit of the inflation-targeting regimes.
11
4.3 Robustness Testing 
As discussed above, a key motivation of the events study literature is that the en-
dogeneity between policy and changes in longer-term interest rates are likely to be 
TABLE 6  International Comparison
a
NZ US UK
1yr1  1yr5  2yr7  1yr  1yr5  1yr10  1yr  1yr5  1yr10 
Mon
Mon 0.88*** 0.25*** 0.11  0.47*** -0.04  -0.16**  0.72**  -0.12 
CPI
 b 4***  1.4**  0.5 1.67*** 1.81*** 1.09*  2.28**  0.07  -0.43 
GDP 3.8***  1 0.8 4.39*** 4.12*  3.76**  2.05*** 0.26  -1.08 
U -6.6***  -4.5**  -2* -1.76 *** -0.77  0.14 
RS 1.3***  0.7**  0.4*  2.97*** 2.62**  1.93**  1.58**  -1.08* 
Chile Canada  Sweden 
1yr1  1yr5  1yr10  1yr  1yr5  1yr10  1yr  1yr5  1yr10 
Mon 0.15*** NA 0.22  0.81*** NA -0.28  0.72**  NA 0.25 
CPI 0.4 NA 1.86  1.49*  NA -0.27  1.94*  NA 1.01 
GDP 0.25  NA 1.1 -1.01  NA -2.35  0.79  NA 0.72 
U NA 0.31  NA -0.29  -0.26  NA -0.42 
RS NA 1.48**  NA -0.29  -0.49  NA 0.26 
Notes:
a Basis point responses per standard deviation of the data. Monetary responses are to a one-basis- 
-point surprise. US figures are from (Gürkaynak, Sack, Swanson, 2005a); UK results are from (Gür-
kaynak, Levin, Swanson, 2006) and the 2003 Working Paper version of (Gürkaynak et al., 2005a); 
Canadian results are from the (Gürkaynak, Levin, Marden, Swanson, 2006), New Zealand results are 
the 30-minute-window responses with the s3 monetary policy surprise measure. 
bRetail Price Index(Core) for the UK. 
10 In contrast, Karagedikli and Siklos (forthcoming) show that these shocks do significantly impact spot
exchange rates in a “buffering manner“, as might be expected in a small open economy with a freely float-
ing exchange rate regime. 
11  In line with this interpretation, Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2006) find that surprises significantly
moved long-term rates in the United Kingdom before the Bank of England was made independent and had 
its inflation-target objective legislated. In the post-independence sample reported in Table 6, effects on
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very small at very high data frequencies. In New Zealand, the problem is likely to be 
small even at daily frequencies as RBNZ policy announcements are timed to coincide 
with days when there are no major domestic data releases. That said, there may be 
international data releases and monetary policy surprises on the day of an RBNZ 
policy announcement and for this reason it might be expected that the estimated 
effects are smaller at daily frequencies than at intra-daily frequencies. To test this and 
the general  robustness  of  the results  we  rer-estimated  the regressions  at  daily  fre-
quencies. The results are shown in Annex Table A1. In general, the estimated coef-
ficients are in line with the intra-daily estimates and are still quite significant for 
shorter-term interest rates, although the fit of the equations tends to be lower at daily 
frequencies.  
As noted above, our sample contains two kinds of monetary policy decisions. 
Decisions accompanied by the release of a detailed Monetary Policy Statement (which 
includes a forecast for inflation, GDP, interest rates and other variables) and the intra- 
-quarter reviews, which only gives a very brief non-numerical update on the outlook. 
Given the large difference in the information provided between the MPS and the intra- 
quarter reviews, it is natural to ask whether surprises arising from a MPS have 
a larger effect on the yield curve. To test this, we re-estimate the regressions above 
with an additional dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the announcement 
was an MPS and 0 for the intra-quarter reviews. This dummy permits an intercept 
effect at points on the yield curve. We also include an interaction term to permit 
a change in the estimated slope.  
Key results of these regressions are in Annex Tables A2 and A3. Although 
the slope coefficients (not reported) are not significantly different from those of the ori-
ginal regressions, the dummy terms at times are significant, albeit modest. Moreover, 
the coefficients on the dummy terms tend to be slightly larger and more significant 
when the equations are estimated at daily frequencies. These results suggest that de-
cisions accompanied by publication of a MPS have a stronger impact on market 
interest rates, but markets take some time to digest the information provided in 
the lengthy statements.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we estimated the impact of monetary and data surprises on New 
Zealand's yield curve. We argue that the pattern observed reflects the credibility and 
transparency of New Zealand's inflation targeting regime. In line with what has been 
found in inflation-targeting countries, data surprises die out at long horizons. At shorter 
horizons, interest rates generally move in a direction consistent with policy objec-
tives. For example, our estimates show that when there is a positive inflation or GDP 
surprise, forward rates increase in anticipation of the central bank's reaction. These 
results are likely a function of both the transparent approach to policy making at 
the RBNZ and the credibility of the regime.  
It is evident that central banks take communication with markets very se-
riously and some, such as the RBNZ, expend considerable resources communicating 
policy decisions to financial  markets and the economy more broadly. It has been 
argued  that  such  transparent  communication  risks  credibility  as,  given  the uncer-
tainties in policy making, commitments cannot always be followed through. Our 
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ANNEX 
TABLE A1  Daily Responses 
1y1  1y2  1y3  1y5  2y2  2y3  2y5  2y7 
s1  1.040***  0.725***  0.472***  0.265***  0.913***  0.601***  0.337***  0.218*** 
se (0.099)  (0.148)  (0.105)  (0.067)  (0.115)  (0.118)  (0.072)  (0.077) 
R sq  0.75  0.30  0.33  0.14  0.58  0.34  0.22  0.06 
Obs  55  55  55  55  55  55  55  55 
s2  0.640***  0.276*  0.213**  0.089  0.463***  0.246***  0.127  0.137* 
se (0.142)  (0.153)  (0.105)  (0.094)  (0.138)  (0.122)  (0.097)  (0.073) 
R sq  0.37  0.06  0.10  0.03  0.21  0.09  0.05  0.07 
Obs  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  45 
s3  1.026***  0.529***  0.442***  0.200*  0.788***  0.487***  0.288  0.151* 
se (0.070)  (0.146)  (0.088)  (0.104)  (0.097)  (0.110)  (0.103)  (0.087) 
R sq  0.66  0.18  0.31  0.12  0.44  0.26  0.20  0.06 
Obs  43  43  43  43  43  43  43  43 
CPI 0.061***  0.071***  0.039***  0.051**  0.067***  0.055***  0.043***  0.013 
se (0.012)  (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.018) 
R sq  0.63  0.37  0.23  0.30  0.61  0.46  0.33  0.03 
Obs  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23 
GDP 0.041***  0.067***  0.040***  0.019  0.054***  0.053***  0.022  0.029* 
se (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
R sq  0.40  0.30  0.34  0.05  0.35  0.35  0.08  0.13 
Obs  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23 
CA -0.019  -0.019  -0.006  0.001  -0.019  -0.013  -0.008  0.032 
se (0.014)  (0.030)  (0.022)  (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
R sq  0.11  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.02  0.01  0.05 
Obs  22  22  22  22  22  22  22  22 
RS 0.014***  0.015***  0.011***  0.005  0.014***  0.013***  0.008  0.013** 
se (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
R sq  0.21  0.07  0.07  0.01  0.14  0.08  0.04  0.11 
Obs  68  68  68  68  68  68  68  68 
TB -0.002  0.019  -0.002  -0.006  -0.003  0.008  0.002  -0.011 
se (0.003)  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.004)  (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
R sq  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01 
Obs  65  65  65  65  65  65  65  65 
U -0.065***  -0.062***  -0.042  -0.034*  -0.064***  -0.052***  -0.029*  -0.011 
se (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.022) 
R sq  0.44  0.27  0.11  0.10  0.43  0.21  0.09  0.01 
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TABLE A2  Effects of MPS Dummy in 30-minute Windows 
1y1  1y2  1y3  1y5  2y2  2y3  2y5  2y7 
30 Min  30 Min  30 Min  30 Min  30 Min  30 Min  30 Min  30 Min 
Surprise 1 
MPS 0.013*  0.015  0.015**  0.003  0.014  0.015  0.005  0.002 
se (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.009) 
R sq  0.88  0.36  0.51  0.41  0.74  0.46  0.51  0.14 
Obs  55  55  55  55  55  55  55  55 
Surprise 2 
MPS 0.030  0.030*  0.020*  0.012  0.030*  0.025*  0.013  0.007 
se (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
R sq  0.46  0.19  0.26  0.28  0.37  0.23  0.27  0.14 
Obs  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  45 
Surprise 3 
MPS 0.023  0.032**  0.021**  0.011  0.027**  0.027**  0.012  0.005 
se (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
R sq  0.66  0.37  0.39  0.40  0.60  0.41  0.41  0.19 
Obs  43  43  43  43  43  43  43  43 
TABLE A3  Effects of MPS Dummy in Daily Windows for One- and Two-year Rates 
1yr1  1yr2  1yr3  1yr5  2yr2  2yr3  2yr5  2yr7 
1 Day  1 Day  1 Day  1 Day  1 Day  1 Day  1 Day  1 Day 
Surprise 1 
MPS 0.026**  0.047**  0.020  0.003  0.035**  0.033**  0.006  0.017 
se (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
R sq  0.77  0.38  0.36  0.20  0.63  0.41  0.29  0.18 
Obs  55  55  55  55  55  55  55  55 
Surprise 2 
MPS 0.041*  0.061**  0.029  0.006  0.051**  0.045**  0.011  0.014 
se (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
R sq  0.43  0.20  0.17  0.04  0.32  0.21  0.07  0.13 
Obs  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  45 
Surprise 3 
MPS 0.034**  0.070***  0.029*  0.011  0.052**  0.049***  0.013  0.015 
se (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
R sq  0.69  0.35  0.38  0.18  0.54  0.40  0.24  0.17 
Obs  43  43  43  43  43  43  43  43 Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                    537 
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